

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**A REVIEW OF AMERICA'S STRATEGY:
WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR**

by

Colonel Mark R. Wallace
United States Army

Colonel Bob Applegate
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Review of America's Strategy What It Will Take to Win the Global War on Terror				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mark Wallace				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 22	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Mark R. Wallace

TITLE: A Review of America's Strategy: What It Will Take To Win the Global War on Terror

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 5 January 2006 WORD COUNT: 5688 PAGES: 21

KEY TERMS: Extremism, Radical Fundamentalism, al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM), Jihadist Strategy, counterterrorism, reform, transformation

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Terrorism is one of the most significant, long-term threats to world-wide peace and stability. To eliminate terrorism, nations of the world must first recognize the seriousness of the threat and fully comprehend our enemy's goals, as well as their strategy for achieving their revolutionary objectives. According to al-Qaeda's manifesto, their seven-phase master plan for world domination is to establish a global caliphate, which threatens our democratic values and way of life. This paper will discuss the nature of the conflict and why it is a "total war" against an enemy with goals, objectives, leadership, organization and a strategy for winning. This threat is very different from what conventional warfare theorists imagined with armies facing one another in battle – we are engaged in fighting a "war of ideas." The uni-polar world and the Information Age have changed how our opponent is conducting this war and how nation states should approach countering the threat. This paper will also address al-Qaeda's strategy and how the United States and our allies should use all of the elements of national power to craft an international strategic response to defeat the growing threat of transnational terrorism and the spread of al-Qaeda's world-wide insurgency.

REVIEW OF AMERICA'S STRATEGY: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Since September 11, 2001, the United States government has used the term Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) to describe one of our nation's highest priorities. Our government's strategic planning documents in the GWOT are comprehensive and proscriptive. However, our strategic guidance documents have some shortfalls that must receive additional attention and emphasis. Until our government, the people of the United States and our allies know and understand whom we are fighting, it will be impossible to win the "war of ideas" which is a critical aspect of the struggle. Although our government's concept involves a comprehensive, strategic plan involving offensive and defensive measures, the approach misses the mark with regard to understanding exactly what makes our enemy tick and how we should prioritize our efforts to defeat them. Sun Tzu made first reference to this age-old maxim in his book *The Art of War* when he wrote, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."¹

Before we can design an effective strategy, we first need to understand who our enemy is, what they want, why, and how they plan to accomplish their objectives. This analysis is critical to understanding one of the universally accepted maxims of war – center of gravity. Al Qaeda and Associated Movement's (AQAM) plan is simple - they want to use a modern form of historically proven insurgency models for political movements defeating legitimate governments. "The fundamental precept is that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat."² The current buzz-word for this theory of war is "Fourth Generation Warfare." This theory is not evolutionary - it is basically an Information Age version of Mao Tse Tung's "People's War" of ideological mobilization. Successful examples where this type of guerrilla, modern insurgency methodology has paid off and the United States has lost insurgency-type conflicts include: Cuba, Lebanon, Somalia, and Vietnam. Another recent example is Russia's experience in Afghanistan. These types of insurgency can be defeated; however, it requires a thorough understanding of the enemy and a thoroughly integrated, patient plan that incorporates all of the elements of national power. The bottom line is the United States cannot force our adversaries to fight a short duration, high technology war which we will easily dominate.

AQAM's Strategic Plan

The AQAM master strategy to take over the world and turn it into an Islamic state was recently revealed by Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein. Hussein says al Qaeda views its struggle as a long-term war with seven distinct phases. Phase one is the "Awakening" in the consciousness of Muslims worldwide. The aim of the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks was to provoke the U.S. into declaring war on the Islamic world - thereby mobilizing the radicals. Phase two is "Opening Eyes" - the period we are in now which should last until 2006 - where the terrorists hope to make the "Western conspiracy" aware of the "Islamic community" and make their secret battalions ready for battle. Phase three, "Arising and Standing Up", should last from 2007 to 2010, with increasingly frequent attacks against secular Turkey and arch-enemy Israel. Phase four, between 2010 and 2013, will see the downfall of hated Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Phase five will be between 2013 and 2016, at which point an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared. Phase six, from 2016 on, will be a period of "total confrontation" between believers and non-believers. Phase seven, the final stage, is described as "definitive victory". This phase should last no longer than two years and be completed by 2020. Hussein writes that in the terrorists' eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the "One-and-a-half billion Muslims," the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed.³ Their desired endstate is to establish an Islamic theocracy by destroying the moderate wing of Islam, destroying Israel, and inflicting maximum damage and human suffering on the infidels.

AQAM's Operational Plan

AQAM wants the world to believe that Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi is a mujahedin, strategic genius that left Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime to prepare for an anticipated insurgency in Iraq. Their ideological story is that Zarqawi left to become AQAM's Amir of Iraq and the leader of AQAM in the Arab world. His mission is to cleanse the Arab lands of infidels and carry AQAM's cause forward to the third phase. Zarqawi's mission is to isolate U.S. forces in Iraq, target Iraqi police and National Guard that shield Americans, target Arab and foreign diplomats to the infidel regime, attack Shi'ia groups identified as "the symbol of heresy of the sons of Al-Alqami (Badr Corps, clerics Al Hakim and Ayatollah Sistani), and export the Iraqi insurgency model throughout the rest of the Middle East in the form of a global Jihad movement."⁴ "The West knows well that a victory of the Jihadi insurgency in Iraq means that 'the Jihad will move to the rest of the Middle East and the other Arab countries, and from there will become world-wide in the form of a global jihad movement'."⁵

AQAM's Center of Gravity

Despite factionalism and ideological differences between militant fundamentalist Islamic organizations, there exist a few broad unifying themes. They share a core set of virulently anti-western beliefs and generally have some common goals: to destroy the moderate wing of Islam, establish Islamic theocracies, and destroy the nation-state of Israel. Based upon this evaluation, it is assessed that the movement's center of gravity is their militant, extremist ideology.

First and foremost, an insurgency requires an alternative ideology or ruling system to replace the existing government. The insurgents must offer an alternative form of governance, or without legitimacy, there is no chance for success. As discussed earlier, the enemy's center of gravity is their militant, extremist ideology. Additional capabilities and characteristics required by insurgencies to be successful include: leadership (organization), popular support, safehaven (training, planning, recruiting, etc), perception of legitimacy (chance for success), resources (money, weapons, etc.), communications (media), and mobility (freedom of movement). All of these areas must be engaged by simultaneously applying harmonized interagency efforts.

When you are fighting an opponent who has no army to destroy and no capital to capture, you must devise an alternative solution in order to defeat him. An indirect approach may offer some answers to defeat AQAM.

President Bush may have characterized the Global War on Terror (GWOT) best by speaking without text on August 6, 2004, when he said, "We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies, who happen to use terror as a weapon." The President obviously understands the GWOT; however, he cannot win the war alone.

U.S. Strategy and Analysis

The United States has been involved in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) for over four years. This paper offers a critical assessment of the current status of the United States government's national policies and strategies to fight and win what has become a protracted conflict. This paper also offers seven specific areas for recommended improvements. There are no easy, short-term solutions to this highly volatile and complex problem. However, one thing is crystal clear – AQAM must not be allowed to succeed, or our way of life and very existence are in serious jeopardy.

The *National Security Strategy* states, "Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command and control, and

communications; material support; and finances.”⁶ This is an easy way to characterize our opponent in a physical context, which is far easier to deal with by conventional, direct attack means. However, if one correctly understands the enemy and environment, we have our priorities slightly out of order. More to the point, our Information Operations Themes and messages should have a higher priority and receive more attention at the highest levels. We must first attack the enemy’s center of gravity by winning the “war of ideas” through an extensive and comprehensive Information Operations campaign – winning the hearts and minds – and then capture / kill the terrorists who seek to do us harm.⁷ Our National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy espouse supporting themes and nested concepts.

The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* designates AQAM as “America’s most immediate and serious threat.”⁸ The *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* is the capstone document for the United States’ conduct of the GWOT. It states, “The enemy is not one person. It is not a single political regime. Certainly it is not a religion. The enemy is terrorism -...”⁹ The Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.”¹⁰ Terrorism is not an end to itself; it is merely a tactic used by an asymmetric threat. Throughout history, countless movements have used violence to destroy established order in a society and bring attention to their cause. This is the basis of an insurgency. Joint Pub 1-02 describes insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”¹¹ Our government has it almost right. However, the enemy’s center of gravity remains their violent, extremist ideology of hate and intolerance – not terrorism - terrorism is only a secondary tactic. Our enemies are violent extremists, and by Presidential decree, those who support them.

Although controversial, the Bush policy of preemption contained in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism is a good example of the kind of tough-minded responsiveness required that democracies seldom muster the nerve to enact.¹² Other welcome post-9/11 interagency policy changes are the creation of the Muslim World Outreach, Iraq and Afghanistan Interagency Operations Groups, and the Terrorist Finance Policy Coordination Committees.¹³

There is no doubt that stopping terrorism is vital to protecting our nation. Ultimately, we cannot defeat our opponent without overwhelming force. However, military force by itself will not stem the flow of suicide bombers and cowardly attacks against unarmed civilians. Our long-term battle is with the ruthless ideologues and their ministry of hate. It is in this realm that we will regain the initiative and advantage.

What has Changed In the Global War On Terror

The United States and our allies are engaged in an epic ideological struggle facing a different enemy than we were on September 11, 2001. Prior to 9/11, AQAM had a clear center of gravity that was vulnerable to conventional military means. However, early successes achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan, including estimates as high as 50% of senior leadership captured or killed, hundreds of millions of dollars seized, and as high as 75% of financial support mechanisms disrupted, have forced our adversaries to transform the way they are organized and operate. AQAM has demonstrated that they are flexible, adaptive and capable of making significant organizational changes while retaining the ability to command and control, communicate, and conduct combat operations. This resiliency and effectiveness is illustrated by the numerous communications released by senior AQAM officials and their demonstrated ability to continue conducting complex terrorist attacks. There is ample evidence available regarding this point, but the most notable recent examples of sensational attacks claimed or attributed to AQAM are the Bali nightclub bombing on October 12, 2002 which killed 202 people¹⁴; Madrid, Spain on the morning of March 11, 2004 when near simultaneous attacks on four commuter trains killed 191 people¹⁵; London, England on July 7, 2005 when four bombs exploded within 50 seconds targeting the underground rail and bus transportation networks killing 56¹⁶; and the 9 November 2005 simultaneous attacks against three hotels in Amman, Jordan which killed 57 people¹⁷.

Mr. Bruce Hoffman of the Rand Corporation offers the best description of AQAM's transformation in his September 2005 Congressional testimony.

The al Qaeda movement therefore is now best described as a networked transnational constituency rather than a monolithic, international terrorist organization with an identifiable command and control apparatus it once was. The result is that today there are many al Qaedas rather than a single al Qaeda of the past. The current al Qaeda therefore exists more as an ideology that has become a vast enterprise – an international franchise with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base ...¹⁸

In order to counter this evolving threat the United States and our allies are going to have to get tougher and react faster while working together on an unprecedented scale over the long-haul. Today, America needs to wage a different type of war against an enemy that is changing to counter our tactics and strategy.

What Needs to Change

Initially, the Bush Administration got our nation's foreign policies and overall strategy to win the GWOT about right. Some would argue this point, but the lengthy list of early successes mentioned above is impressive. However, it was weighted toward the military using a "capture or kill" mentality. What worked early on will not necessarily work now. For the most part, our current national policies and strategy are thorough, comprehensive and complementary. However, AQAM cannot be defeated in a series of tactical military operations. Most analysts agree that winning the GWOT and destroying AQAM will take several years if not decades to achieve. Winning will require a comprehensive, adaptive "network approach" to policy and strategy design which simultaneously leverages all the elements of national power. In order to counteract the elusive and evolving nature of the threat we and our allies must forge new methods to break the cycle of terror and violence. To ensure our continued success there are four distinct decision points (1-4) and three critical capabilities (5-7) that require continuous emphasis and a holistic, integrated approach. In rough priority order, the seven "Is" are:

- Information Operations
- Iraq
- Iran
- Israel –Palestine
- International
- Interagency Reform
- Intelligence Reform

Information Operations

Most experts agree that AQAM's center of gravity is the appeal of their radical ideology. Most critics would also agree that our current Strategic Communications (SC) plan has thus far been grossly ineffective. Additionally, Congress should immediately and appropriately resource the recommended SC effort.¹⁹ Convincing the people of the Middle East that we have common interests and values, and more to offer than AQAM is critical to winning the "war of ideas." Key to this is creating a more favorable image of the United States in the Muslim world. In order to accomplish this we should thoroughly overhaul our public diplomacy and communications strategies. In order to be effective our SC strategy and policies should continuously emphasize three core SC messages and themes. First, we must deprive AQAM of the ability to discredit the U.S. and our ideals. In a recent Foreign Affairs article, Zeyno Baran wrote,

In the wake of the war in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, however, the credibility and moral authority of the U.S. in the Muslim world is at an all-time low and so this will not be easy. In fact rehabilitating America's image will probably take decades and require an ideological campaign highlighting values common to Western and Muslim worlds.²⁰

Second, Muslim government leaders must be convinced that the AQAM goal of overthrowing "apostate" governments is a real and credible threat. They are the key to influencing and "helping moderate Imams win the theological and ideological civil war currently taking place in the Muslim World."²¹ Third, AQAM must be exposed for the fraud and abomination to Islam that it truly is. This can be accomplished by encouraging peaceful Islamic religious leaders to promote tolerance, interfaith dialogue, and secular school curriculums that emphasize patriotism and democracy.

Osama bin Laden is recognized world-wide for his role in the attacks on September 11, 2001 and as the eloquent, charismatic leader of the AQAM movement. Today, his face has the same level of international recognition as that of any ruler of a legitimate country. We and our allies have failed to portray him as the monster he is. During World War II, Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt successfully demonized Adolph Hitler and the Nazi party by demonstrating their human rights abuses and oppressive regime, and American leadership successfully did the same to communism during the Cold War by highlighting it as a threat to democratic values and our way of life. Our Information Operations campaign should discredit Osama bin Laden and expose his dogma of hate and intolerance for what it is. We should stop ignoring him and expose him as a false prophet and a mass murderer. Some would argue that he is irrelevant and that the war will continue when he is eventually captured or killed, but he is a folk hero to millions of Muslim youths and represents a strong cult of personality that acts as a lightning rod for Jihadist recruiting. As one of the generals of a new generation, the same case can be made for Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. Fundamentally, the struggle against violent extremism is a war of ideas, and a more aggressive, direct attack on those ideas and the men behind them is required to win. Our Information Operations campaign must portray the GWOT as an all-out campaign to expose, ridicule and destroy everything AQAM stands for – murder, horror, intolerance, disrespect for human rights and a false view of Islam. Moderate leaders of Muslim nations must understand that Takfir (excommunication), suicide bombings, and massive killings of Muslims should be exploited by enlisting prominent Muslim clerics' support.

A recent National Security Report suggests that,

The United States needs to recognize the soft underbelly of this movement, a set of tensions that the senior Al-Qaeda senior leadership could not do more to elucidate for us – namely, that the old guard is panicking that Abu Musab al-Zaeqawi is repeating mistakes they learned in past jihadi experiences: killing innocents, which serves to disaffect the public to their ideology. In short, the United States should be pursuing a strategy that separates broader Muslim populations from this body of ideas in all dimensions of this fight, particularly over the internet.²²

The report describes a virtual, internet Emirate that AQAM is using for command and control, and propaganda purposes. The conclusion is that AQAM is using our own Western technology against us. Until we find mechanisms to control dissemination of violent, radical ideologies over the internet, our opponents will continue to use it to propagate their virulent ideology on a global scale. Of course, fear of censorship in free democracies will hamper getting this phenomenon under control, but control measures must be emplaced soon.

Deterrence worked during the Cold War and may be useful in this situation. Some people argue that deterrence no longer works against terrorists. Mr. Colin S. Gray provides some insight into how deterrence can still work. “Al-Qaeda[sic] has many would-be martyrs in its ranks, but the organization is most careful with the lives of its key officers, and it functions strategically. It can be deterred by the fact and expectation of strategic failure.”²³ He goes on to explain how this weakness can compliment our strategic Information Operations campaign. “It is necessary to demonstrate that terrorism fails. Brave people will sacrifice their live[sic] for a cause, but what if nothing seems to change in the world? Al Qaeda[sic] has some distinctly terrestrial goals, and those can be denied by competent policies and strategies. Many of its officers and recruits should be discouraged by a growing realization that the Jihad they are waging is an exercise in futility.”²⁴ This is a powerful concept that can serve to link our Information Operations campaign with our military kinetic options.

Our moderate Middle East partners struggle continuously with the popular perceptions that the U.S. is only concerned with the Middle East because of our dependence on oil. Consequently, they feel exploited. We should endeavor to reduce our dependence (as well as our allies’) on fossile fuels. We should make every effort to change the Middle Eastern perception that we are occupying their territory or replacing Imperialists.

Our most potent weapon against the enemy’s militant, extremist ideology is Information Operations. We must rally universal public opinion and support by making some fundamental changes to our public diplomacy and find better systems for delivering our message. Relevant themes are: delegitimize the extremist movement by exposing their leaders as apostates, false prophets and mass murderers of innocent Muslims. Clarify our relationship with our allies in the

Middle East. Emphasize the point that we are not imperialists exploiting their country's wealth. We should create an all-out campaign to ridicule and destroy members of the insurgency by exposing their cause's intolerance and disrespect for human life, and a false view of Islam. Finally, the U.S. government should establish a Cabinet-level department akin to the British Ministry of Information (MOI) to manage the effort. Most governments have an MOI and we should too.

Iraq

Iraq has become the nexus for the GWOT and will be a critical test of America and our allies' strength and resolve. We must be successful in establishing a stable, democratic government. The stakes are tremendously high and we absolutely cannot afford to withdraw our forces before the job is done. Otherwise, we risk handing the jihadists a significant strategic victory on the level of the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Our capitulation would have severe consequences by giving AQAM a new base of operations (with considerably more wealth than Afghanistan had under the Taliban) for exporting their jihad to the rest of the Middle East, Europe and Africa – not to mention a tremendously significant propaganda platform for recruiting and financial support.²⁵ The new *Department of Defense Directive 30000.05*²⁶ amounts to formal acknowledgement of DoD's role in Stability Operations. It will go a long way toward changing the military culture and support to the mission in Iraq. Another significant recent publication is the *National Strategy for Victory In Iraq*, published in November 2005. The document is a little overly idealistic about democracy and freedom in the Middle East because AQAM will not close up shop if every Muslim country were to suddenly become democratic (AQAM rejects democracy). However, it is tempered by a healthy dose of realism in the expectations of its eight pillars and strategic objectives. One of the most refreshing aspects of this document is the acknowledgement of the need for flexibility and repeated calls for assessments and adaptation. The other "Is" discussed in this paper apply equally to Iraq.

Iran

Iran is another decisive point in the GWOT and the U.S. needs to take determined action against Iranian support to terrorism and AQAM. "Iran became home to some of AQAM's most wanted after the fall 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Tehran has admitted as much claiming that AQAM operatives were under 'house arrest' and would be tried."²⁷ No trial has ever taken place and AQAM operatives continue to move about freely to plan terrorist operations world-wide. Equally well known is Iran's support for Hamas and Hezbollah terrorist organizations. Iran cannot be allowed to provide support to and be a safehaven for terror. Iran continues to

interfere in Iraq and Afghanistan by supporting attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces. The fact that Iran desires to acquire nuclear weapons is equally disturbing, but remains a future problem – terrorism is here and now. The solution on nuclear weapons may be to assist Iran with acquiring legitimate nuclear power while extracting verifiable concessions that preclude them from building weapons. The U.S. must continue taking a hard line toward Iran. We should work together with the UN, France, Russia, China, Japan and Germany to put tough diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and coerce them into turning over their AQAM guests, stop activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, turn away from acquiring nuclear weaponry, and finally start behaving like a responsible state actor.

Israel – Palestine

Probably the most significant issue is the perception of unqualified U.S. support for Israel against Palestine. Until this issue is resolved, it is doubtful there will ever be peace in the Middle East. Since 9/11, the Bush Administration has focused their attention on other issues and seeking solutions to the Israel – Palestine conflict were more or less tabled for the last four years. We must change the perception in the Middle East that the U.S. does not care by taking the lead on this important issue. The U.S. is the only government that can wield the necessary influence with Israel to make any meaningful progress in peace negotiations. The issues are well known and workable, but not if all parties are not at the negotiation table. “Being seen to play a more active and equitable role in resolving this conflict will have an enormously salutary effect on Middle Eastern stability, global Muslim attitudes towards the U.S., and America’s image abroad.”²⁸

International / Intergovernmental

Promotion of good governance through pluralism, representation, and the rule of law can change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror. Oppressive dictatorships drive dissenting opinions underground and breed radical reactions. Democracy and political reform allow other good things to happen that get at the roots of instability such as ungoverned areas (safehaven), equality/women’s rights, education and economic development. Arab leaders must begin the process of slowly reforming their governments to become more democratic. Our partners in the GWOT must find new, innovative legal ways to suppress militant Imams that preach hate, jihad, martyrdom and anti-Semitism without sacrificing too many civil liberties. This is the quickest way to disrupt the spread of radicalism. Although controversial, the clumsily-titled Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) introduced a plethora of legislative

changes which significantly increased the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in the United States, but it may not be enough to counter the evolving threat.

Specific areas to improve through international cooperation include:²⁹ improved border security through better passenger and cargo screening procedures at our ports, airfields and border checkpoints. These delicate tasks must be accomplished before trained jihadists begin returning home from Iraq without treading too heavily on civil liberties. Overly aggressive measures risk creating additional disaffection and discontent thereby breeding fertile grounds for AQAM's recruitment effort. How nations decide to deal with the spread of Global Jihad to Europe and other Arab countries and the new generation of "Iraqi Veterans" returning from Iraq trained to use weapons and explosives will be critical. Border security will be more important than ever in dealing with the new generation of Jihadis and mujahedin trained in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sharing international databases for border security is essential. Other key areas to encourage international cooperation include oversight of curriculum at Madrassas, regulation of the Hawala banking system and monitoring the sermons of radical Imams.

Our friends and allies in the GWOT are a perishable commodity that should not be taken for granted. In order to regain and maintain the momentum, international relationships need to periodically be repaired and strengthened. To avoid policy misunderstandings and ensure our strategies remain synchronized, new relationships and agreements should be sought with governments as well as International Organizations.

As the world's only remaining superpower, the imperative of American leadership is undisputable. If the GWOT is going to be successful over the long haul, civilized nations are going to have to treat the causes of terrorism by promoting economic prosperity, human rights, humanitarian assistance, fighting organized crime and corruption. Coalition building and mutual support is paramount. Organizations to leverage include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, African Union, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab League, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Some we work well with and others need bridges built between them and ourselves.

Interagency Reform

Interagency³⁰ reform shortfalls are well documented and are receiving close Congressional scrutiny; however, the rate of change is inadequate to keep pace with our opponent's transnational mobility and ability to adapt. We need to create highly capable,

streamlined counterterrorism organizations able to function quickly that have broad powers and can act decisively with maximum efficiency. Currently, the Executive Branch and National Security Council (NSC) are the lowest levels at which policy and strategy issues can be developed and integrated. Given the President's competing roles in domestic affairs and party politics he cannot focus on national security as originally envisioned in the Constitution.

Although our current national security structure and culture remained effective for decades, they cannot compete with today's more competitive, sinister, and capable enemies. Structural and cultural flaws undermine America's ability to respond to complex, long-term threats such as terrorism and other security, economic, environmental and demographic problems that will increasingly emerge.³¹

Interdepartmental bureaucracy inevitably leads to competition that focuses more on resource allocation than on threats to national security and badly needed interagency reform measures. Some sort of innovative, legislative forcing function like the 1947 National Security Act, or the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, are required in order to address national security issues holistically by leveraging various government agencies to develop and implement integrated, comprehensive strategies. "In September 2004, General Peter Pace, USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked whether we needed a Goldwater-Nichols-like change for the interagency process."³² A recent National Defense University paper recommended some form of Executive Order or legislation to force the interagency to make the following reforms: create national-level Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) that bring together all parts of the government to focus on specific counterterrorism issues, lower the decision-making authority for interdepartmental and interagency decisions to the deputy undersecretary level, appoint a separate counterterrorism advisor to the President which will allow the National Security Advisor to provide independent opinions, establish a permanent executive or governing board from the departments and agencies to function like the Joint Chiefs of Staff.³³ These changes will ensure "jointness" and interoperability among the various departments and agencies by empowering a GWOT board or chairman, clarifying the chain of command, centralizing authority and mandating interagency participation in the GWOT process. These reforms will improve development of policies and strategy implementation as well as improve the balance between military and other instruments of national power. These changes will be painful and will not occur without decisive action by Congress or the Executive Branch.

Intelligence Reform

Intelligence reform efforts are well underway and are receiving close Congressional scrutiny.³⁴ Examples of some initiatives are included in the *9/11 Commission Reports*³⁵ and

Congress' focus on intelligence reform. Significant changes are underway throughout the national intelligence community and are captured in the *National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* published by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in October 2005. Some of the more notable changes are the formation of the office of the Director of National Intelligence empowered with oversight of all national intelligence agencies, creation of Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) at all of the Combatant Commands, the formation of a National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the Policy Coordination Committee for Terrorism Finance. However, the rate of change is inadequate to keep pace with our opponent's transnational mobility and ability to adapt. Several difficult changes are required before intelligence reform is complete. For example, there still is no single database for tracking and analyzing terrorist movement and activity between national intelligence organizations, Combatant Commands and law enforcement agencies. Centralized direction is needed to correct this serious shortfall. Each agency has significant investments in their legacy systems and will not change unless ordered to do so. Additionally, Intelligence Oversight laws do not permit interoperability and information sharing between law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the intelligence community. Further, there are serious cultural and security hurdles to negotiate to protect sources and methods for intelligence assets. None of these obstacles are easy to breach. Until they are, we will have blind spots that may provide our adversaries a tactical advantage.

Conclusion

"In summary, new times, new threats, and new challenges ineluctably make a new strategy approach and new organizational and institutional behaviors necessary."³⁶ A good first step is providing a clear vision, policy and strategy with ways linked to means that will enable a multi-dimensional, interagency / international approach. Arguably, our national policies and strategy have the majority of the requirements documented already. This author recommends including additional clarity in our national policies and strategies concerning the seven "Is" as discussed above.

Even the best strategy will not succeed if the attitudes and actions of government leaders (domestic and international) are not changed. Poverty, unemployment and a Middle Eastern "youth bulge" create a fertile environment of disaffected youth. Combine that with alienation of half of the population (women) and our enemies have a fertile base from which to recruit. We must help our allies with opportunities and economic growth through trade and free enterprise. In order to succeed, we need leaders at all levels united in a common cause, working together

in a spirit of mutual collaboration and cooperation to make the necessary changes to meet the challenges we face. This will undeniably be the most difficult, and perhaps the most critical, missing piece to the puzzle. How far should democracies go to get tough on terror? Unfortunately, most democracies do not have the stomach to go far enough. Regrettably, it will probably take a second 9/11-type event to gather enough public and government resolve to make the hard decisions required to be more than marginally effective at counterterrorism. Maybe renaming "GWOT" to more accurately reflect what it really is will rejuvenate the effort – "Global War On Poverty and Oppression" (GWOPPO).

Our nation's strategic strengths are our message of freedom and democracy, and tremendous military, patriotic and economic power. We must develop a strategy to leverage these strengths to over-power our opponents. It is absolutely imperative that we use all of the elements of national power at our disposal to defeat an opponent as ruthless and unrelenting as AQAM. Time is on their side. We must act now.

Endnotes

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, (Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.

² Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation," *Strategic Forum*, No. 214 (January 2005): 1.

³ Allan Hall, "al Qaeda Chiefs Reveal World Domination Design," *The Age*, Berlin, August 24, 2005, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/08/23/1124562861654.html?oneclick=true>, extracted from *Al-Zarqawi — al Qaeda's Second Generation*, Fouad Hussein. The al Qaeda master plan to take over the world and turn it into an Islamic state was revealed for the first time in a new book. Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein interviewed top lieutenants of the terrorist network, including the mastermind of many atrocities in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. *Al-Zarqawi — al Qaeda's Second Generation* is published only in Arabic, but could be translated into English. Hussein says al Qaeda views its struggle as a long-term war with seven distinct phases. Phase one is the "awakening" in the consciousness of Muslims worldwide following the September 11, 2001, suicide attacks. The aim of the attacks was to provoke the US into declaring war on the Islamic world and thereby mobilizing the radicals. Phase two is "Opening Eyes", the period we are now in and which should last until 2006. Hussein says the terrorists hope to make the "Western conspiracy" aware of the "Islamic community" as al Qaeda continues to mould its secret battalions ready for battle. Phase three, "Arising and Standing Up", should last from 2007 to 2010, with increasingly frequent attacks against secular Turkey and arch-enemy Israel. Phase four, between 2010 and 2013, will see the downfall of hated Arab regimes, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Oil suppliers will be attacked and the US economy will be targeted using cyber terrorism. Phase five will be the point at which an Islamic state, or caliphate, can be declared — between 2013 and 2016. Phase six, from 2016 on, will be a period of "total confrontation". As soon as the caliphate has been declared, the "Islamic army" will instigate the "fight between the believers and the non-believers" that has so often been predicted by al Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden. Phase seven, the final stage, is

described as “definitive victory”. Hussein writes that in the terrorists’ eyes, because the rest of the world will be so beaten down by the “One-and-a-half billion Muslims”, the caliphate will undoubtedly succeed. This phase should be completed by 2020, although the war should not last longer than two years.³

⁴ Mu’ayyed al-Din ibn al-‘alqami was a Shi’ia minister of the last Sunni Khalifah of the Abbasid Empire during the Mongol occupation of Baghdad in the 13th Century. He was accused of high treason and of assisting the Mongol army of Hulagu. He became in Islamic Sunni history, a symbol of Shi’ia high treason against Sunnis. In recent years he has had a leading role in the discourse of the Jihadi Salafis against the Shi’i in Iraq. ‘alqam in Arabic also means one of the most bitter plants – Colocynth.

⁵ Reuven Paz, “Zarqawi’s Strategy in Iraq – Is there a New al-Qaeda?,” *Global Research in International Affairs Center, The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements*, Occasional Papers, vol 3, number 5, August 2005.

⁶ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, SEP 2002), 5.

⁷ In fairness to our senior leadership, this aspect may have been deemphasized to ensure that GWOT did not become characterized as a religious war against Islam.

⁸ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 16 July 2002), vii.

⁹ George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 1.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 428.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 12 April 2001), 216.

¹² Bush, George W., *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003).

¹³ Allan Whitaker, PhD, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, “The National Security Policy Process,” *National Security Policy and Strategy*, United States Army War College, Academic Year 2006, Volume 2, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, AUG 2005.

¹⁴ WIKIPEDIA, *The Free Encyclopedia*, available from http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Bali_nightclub_bombing, accessed 12/4/2005

¹⁵ Ibid, available from http://wikipedia.org/wiki/11_March_2004_Madrid_train_bombings, accessed 12/4/2005

¹⁶ Ibid, available from http://wikipedia.org/wiki/7_July_2005_London_bombings, accessed 12/4/2005

¹⁷ James Phillips, "Zarqawi's Amman Bombings: Jordan's 9/11," *Heritage Foundation*, WebMemo No. 919, 18 Nov 2005.

¹⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat?," *Rand Corporation*, CT-250-1, Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on SEP 29, 2005, 4.

¹⁹ Additionally, Congress should immediately appropriately resource our SC effort. This issue was not considered part of the scope of this project.

²⁰ Zeyno Baran, "Fighting the War of Ideas," *Foreign Affairs*, New York: NOV/DEC 2005, vol 84, Issue 6, 79.

²¹ *Ibid*, 79.

²² Jarret Brachman, "Internet as Emirate: Al-Qaeda's Pragmatic Use of the Virtual Jihad," ROA National Security Report, *The Officer*, December 2005.

²³ Colin S.Gray, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence," *Theory of War and Strategy*, Vol 3, Strategic Studies Institute, *U.S. Army War College*, 29 AUG – 4 SEP 2005, viii, 218.

²⁴ *Ibid*, ix, 219.

²⁵ Bruce Hoffman, "Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat?," *Rand Corporation*, CT-250-1, Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on SEP 29, 2005, 17.

²⁶ Gordan England, U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Department of Defense, Washington D.C., The Pentagon, NOV 2005.

²⁷ Peter Brooks, "Iran-Al-Qaeda Axis," *New York Sun*, 31 OCT 2005. AQ members in Iran include Saif al-Adel AQ's number 3 man, three of UBL's sons (Saad, Mohammad, & Othman) and spokesman Sulaiman Abu Gaith. Some estimates run as high as 25 AQ thugs living in Iran. Why AQ and Iran? Their common goals are global Islamic rule and failure of U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan.

²⁸ Bruce Hoffman, "Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat?," *Rand Corporation*, CT-250-1, Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on SEP 29, 2005, 20.

²⁹ U.S. Congress Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, *9/11 Public Discourse Project*, 5 December 2005.

³⁰ Clark A. Murdock and Richard W.Weitz, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, New Proposals for Defense Reform, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 38 (3rd Quarter 2005).

³¹ Martin J. Gorman and Alexander Kronard, A Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government, Institutionalizing the Interagency Process," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Issue 39, 56.

³² *Ibid*, 51.

³³ Ibid, Page 54-55.

³⁴ John D. Negroponte, *"The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, Transformation through Integration and Innovation,"* (Director of National Intelligence, Washington D.C., The Pentagon, October 2005).

³⁵ Fact Sheet: "Progress on the 9/11 Commission Recommendations," Office of the Press Secretary, *The White House*, 5 December 2005.

³⁶ Bruce Hoffman, "Does Our Counterterrorism Strategy Match the Threat?," *Rand Corporation*, CT-250-1, Testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation on SEP 29, 2005, 20.